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IN THE

SupreiDe Court
OF THE

State of Utah
REXXOLD PENDER,

Plaintiff 0/I'Ul Appell0nt,
Case No.
7344

vs.
R. L. BIRD and

~IAE

C. BIRD, his

·wife, et al,

Defendants and R.espondents.

Brief of Respondents
Statement of

F~acts

Respondents do not agree that the appellant has
stated all the material facts and take exception to the
argumentative nature of the so-called Statement of Facts,
particularly at pages 8 and 9 of his Brief.
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References to the Record in this ease will be according to the numbering of this .Court, the transcript of
testimony being R. 109 to 187.
At page 6 of his Brief, appellant refers to page 13
of Exhibit A as covering property not involved in this
action. A comparison of this deed with Respondent~s
counterclaim (R. 19) discloses that the property involved
is described with reference to two corners of Lot 19,
Block 22, 5 Acre Plat "A" and that page 13 of Exhibit
A involves but one parcel of land.
The statement at page 6 that there was no Auditor's
Affidavit on the 1928 assessment rolls is troublesome.
Counsel for appellant made the statement at a preliminary discussion and it was not denied by respondent.
The trial court did not treat this discussion as evidence
or as a pre-trial since evidence was required by testimony
or stipulation on all those matters. See, for example, R.
177, 178 and 179.
The last paragraph on pag-e 6 of Appellant's Brief
states no evidence of title passing from Salt Lake City
was introduced. But· see page 13 of Exhibit A, also R.
177. Respondents' position was stated by counsel at R.
118 and 123-125; but this probably cannot be considered
evidence.
The top paragraph on page 7 ignores Respondents'
claim to prevail based on deed from Salt Lake City for
delinquent special assessments. (Tr. 118, 123-125, 177,
178).
Appellant fails to state on page 8 of his Brief that
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respondents relied also on section 104-29-1, U.C.A. 1943.
(Tl• 1·J·J_1•)"l 1~1 1 Rs> 183)
•

--

-t)'

_ L

,

L .......

•

Appellant's Brief states on page 9 that taxes were
not paid by Bowers or Hansen for 17 years from 1928.
There is no eYidenre on the years 1935 to 1945, inclusive.
Taxes for 1 ~1:?S to 193-!: were covered hy tax sale for 1928.
(See pages 3 and 5 of Exhibit A). Respondents paid
the taxes from 1946 to 1948, inclusive. (Tr.177).
~\t page 10 Appellant's Brief says:
·'Judgment was also granted to respondents
for the possession of the property (Tr. 69) the
trial judge giving as his reason for finding in
favor of respondents, that appellants' action was
barred by the four year statute of limitations
(Tr. 71).
It is plain from the statements of the trial judge
that respondent did not prevail primarily on the statute
of limitations. (R. 180, 183)
''THE COURT: Well, if you have no title,
how can you raise the statute of limitations on
him~ (R. 182).
"THE COURT: Well, I can rule on that
statute of limitations.-! don't think it is necessary to make that, but for your benefit I wil1
hold that." (R. 183).
Appellant's Specification

of Er'f!ors

Appellant has not argued his specifications of error
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nulnbers 4 ·6 8 9 11 13, 14, and respondent assumes
' ' ' ' '
they are abandoned.
Cross-Assignments of Error
1. The lower court erred in denying respondents'
nwtion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. 64).

POINTS RELIED ON BY RESPONDENT
Appellant's cause of action was barred by the
statute of limitations and respondent should have been
given judgment on the pleadings.
1.

2. If respondent cannot prevail on Point 1, then
respondent should have been given judgment under sec.
104-29-2, U.C.A. 1943
3. The statute of lin1itations does not bar respondent's counterclaim.
4. It was not error to admit testimony that the
deed from Bowers Investment Company to V. Lynn Hansen was in fact a mortgage transaction.
5. Appellant had no title to the property and judgment against him as to all parties was right.
Refusal to permit appellant to amend his complaint in the midst of the trial was not error.
6.

7. Respondents' evidence of title was sufficient to
support judgment quieting their title against plaintiff.
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ARGUl\fENT
Point 1
Appellant's cause of action was barred by the statute
of limitations and respondent should have been given judgment on the pleadings.

Two related question are involved in this Point:
A. Can appellant identify this action with his first
suit against respondents and others, within 104-2-41,
r.C.A. 1943~
B. Are sections 104-2-5, 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as added by chapters 18 and 19, Laws of
Utah 1943, and Section 104-2-6, Utah Code Annotated
1943, as amended by Laws of Utah 1943, chapter 20,
applicable to appellant~
It is conceivable that both the appellant's suit and
respondent's counterclaim are barred and that neither
can move against the other. This Court should endeavor
to avoid such a result. If these statutes bar actions by
both tax title holders and those holding under the former
owner there seems to be no practical method of resolving
the dispute over this property.
These statutes of limitations were intended, and
should be construed, to protect purchasers of tax titles
after four years, particularly where the tax title holder
has gone into possession.
Appellant commenced this suit Oct. 14, 1947, (R. 3)
which was more than four years after the effective date
of these statutes (App. Brief 19) and this action appears
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to be barred unless protected by section 104-2-41, U.C.A.,
1943, so as to give appellant the advantage of his first
suit against respondents and others. (Third Amended
Complaint, par. 2, R. 39).
Our position on this question is based on the assumption that the firfl.t suit involved an alleged cause of action
against these rlefendants Bird and no other persons.
Upon the failure of that action, not upon its merits, a
new suit could. be instituted within one year under the
provisions of ~ection 104-2-41, U.C.A., 1943. Since the
case at bar involves the addition of a new and allegedly
necessary party (R. 39, .par. 3) it is not the same cause
of action and is therefore barred by the statutes discussed herein.

''It is established that in order to comply
with statutory provisions of the character under
consi(1eration, where a new action is brought
after a failure of a prior suit, the second suit
1nust be based substantially upon the same cause
of action, and the parties in each suit must be
the same.'' 8-l: Am. J ur. 232.
This rule was affirmed in Platz v. International
S1nelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 Pac. 187, where the
court said at page 349:

"It may be admitted that when an action
fails otherwise than upon the merits the statute
of limitations does not run, and a new action rnav
be instituted between the same parties and upo~
the same cause of action within one year. Also
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that the plaintiff i~ entitled to the benefits of
Cmnp. Law~ of Utah, 1917. ~N'. G4Rt"
This was an action brought against the wrong corporation initially because the corporation had changed its
name upon dissolution of the original and the second suit
was held to be within the statute because the difference
in identity of the defendants was immaterial.
An Annotation on this question appears at 3 A.L.R.
82-1. and the rule as to identity of the defendants is annotated at pages 826 to 828. The Utah case seems to be in
accord with the general rule that parties defendant need
not be identical if they are substantially identical, but no
rase goes so far as to permit the addition of entirely new
and necessary parties. At page 827 the annotation refers
to two cases involving quiet title suits which show the
significanre of the very question here involved.
"\Yhere the first suit was against various
defendants occupying various parts of the land
sued for, and it ·was severed as to A as to his
part of the land, and later there was a nonsuit
in regard to him, it was held that the statute a:pplied to a new suit against A. East Tennessee
Iron & Coal Co. v. Lawson (1895) --------Tenn.--------,
35 S. vV. 456. But where, in a similar case, the
new suit added other necessary defendants, it
was held that the statute did not apply. East
Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. \Valter (1895) _______ _
Tenn. ________ , 35 ~- W. 459. ''
In Jordan v. Commissioners of Bristol County
("Jfass), 167 N.E. 652, it was held that although a statute
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extends the benefit of the limitation statute for one year
for mere irregularity or formal errors which are corrected upon the second suit, a mistake in naming the
wrong defendant is not within the statute.
And, in Luft v. Factory Mutual Liability Insurance
Co. ( R. I.), 155 At. 526, where a plaintiff brought suit
for .personal injuries against the insured and an insurance company which was dismissed because the wrong
insurance company was named and then a second suit
was brought naming the correct insurance company as
defendant, the court held:
''There is no merit in the plaintiff's further
cbntrntion that they may prosecute their suits
under the provision of Section 9, Chapter 334,
G. L. 1923, which permits the bringing of a new
suit within one year if the original action was
for any cause abated. That statute is not applicable in the case of a defendent which was a
stranger to the original action. See Mackel v.
Pawtucket Gas Co., 48 R. I. 485, 139 A. 308."
The second suit must be on the same cause of action
as the first suit in order to come within the protection of
this statute. Williams v. Nelson, 45 Utah 255, 145 Pac.
39,. 41.
Appellant therefore lost the protection of the statute
(104-2-41) when the second suit was brought against additional and necessary parties, and also because the first
suit failed on the 1nerits. (See Point 2.)
Appellant does not contend that the statutes (1042-5, 5. 10 and 6) are not applicable to one claiming under
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the original owner against the tax title holder, but concedes that by arguing that the statutes apply to both
parties, (App. Brief, 19-20) and either or both may be
barred if the action, defense, or counterclaim he filed
after four years frmn the effeetiYe date of the statutes.
This compels appellant to face the provisions of sec.
10-±-29-2, P.C.A. 19-±3.
Point 2

If respondent cannot prevail on Point 1, then I'espondent should have been given judgment under sec. 104-29-2,
U.C.A. 1943.

Respondents submit that if this Court finds the case
at bar is a cause of action different from that stated in
X o. 80375, appellant may not have the benefit of 104-2-41
and is therefore barred by the time provisions of 104-25.10, U.C.A., 1943, as amended.
If the court finds the case at bar the same cause of
action as No. 80375, appellant is barred because he may
not sue twice on the same cause of action unless he is
protected by a dismissal without perjudi~e under 10429-1.
The case of Pender v. ~1:ose Alix, et al., No. 80375,
was dismissed on motion of defendants Bird after the
appellant had refused to amend following the sustaining of respondents' demurrer. The order of dismissal
was as follows:
''The demurrer of the defendants, R. L. Bird
and l\f ae C. Bird, to the complaint of the plain-
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tiff having been sustained on September 11, 1947,
hy the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of
the above entitled court, on the grounds and for
the reason that there was a misjoinder of parties
defendant, that separate causes of action herein
are ilnproperly united, that several causes of
action are not separately stated, that paragraph
8 was ambiguous in not disclosing to which propert? the claim of any defendant related and for
the ground that paragraph 8 was uncertain in
not disclosing whether the claim of each defendant was as to all property described in the cOinplaint or as to only eertain parcels, and if the
latter then to which .parcels, and the said defendants having given the plaintiff notice of the ruling
on said demurrer on September 17, 1947, thereby
giving plaintiff until September 28, 1947, within
which to amend his complaint, which time was
extended by the court upon application of the
plaintiff to and including October 8, 1947, and the
plaintiff having failed to amend his c01nplaint
vvi thin the time allowed by the court, and the default of the plaintiff in failing· to amend having
been duly entered on October 10, A. D. 1947;
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the
complaint be dismissed as to the defendants, R. L.
Bird and Mae C. Bird.
Dated this 18th day of October, 1947.
(s) ROALD A. HOGENSON
Disrict Judge''
A recent Utah case held that such an order of dismissal barred an attempted second suit. State v. Cali-
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fornia Packing Corporation, 1944, 105 Utah 191, 145 P.
2d 78-1, at 786.

* * *
'' \Yhere a demurrer to the complaint is sustained on the ground that it fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the
defendant (plaintiffn refuses to plead further,
and the court dismisses the action for that reason,
such judginent of dismissal will prevent the maintenance of a new action for the same cause of
action where the allegations in the two complaints
are substantially the same, and no substantially
new facts are alleged in the new complaint. This
is true even though the court was incorrect in
holding that the original complaint did not state a
cause of action.'' (authorities cited)
Since the complaint as to defendants Bird in the s·econd
action, No. 81647, avers substantially the same facts as
the complaint in the first action, No. 80375, appellant
should be barred from bringing the case at bar.
As stated, by way of argument, in the California
Packing case at page 786 of 145 p. 2d:
''A dismissal of action after a demurrer has
been sustained and plaintiff has refused to plead
further is not mentioned in Section 104-29-1 as a
ground for a 'dismissal without prejudice' so it
must come under Section 104-29-2 and be 'with
prejudice'.''
And so here, since the order of dismissal in the first
suit was not upon any of! the grounds stated in 104-29'-1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
the case falls within 104-29-2 and the instant suit, not
following a dismissal not upon the merits, cannot be revived.
To repeat: If the cause of action is different, the
second suit does not -come within the protection of 104-241 and is barred by the statutes of limitations. And if
the cause of action is the same ·it is barred by the dismis:-:al on the merits under 104-29-2.
Point 3
The statute of limitations does not bar r·espondent'S'
counterclaim.

A cursory reading of the statutes suggests that their
purpose was to compel fee owners who lose their property at tax sales to take action within four years from
the date of sale to the county, or forever hold their peace.
A study of these statutes, as amended, suggests the possihilit~, that both the purchaser of the tax title and the
original fee owner must within four years from the date
of tax sale bring action for recovery of possession or involving the title of lands sold to the county.
These sections are all so similar that they are confusing. As we analyze them, they are reconciled as follows: 104-2-5 as amended simply adds to the previous
provision for actions involving recovery or possession
of lands a shorter period than seven years for actions
to recover property ''_held hy anothrr under tax deed.''
This limitation was elaborated by 104-2-5.10 which applied specifically to property sold pursuant to 80-10-68
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(6), which provision was enacted by Laws of Utah, 1939,
Chapter 101. This section ( 104-2-5.10) applied both to
actions for reeoYery or possession and to defenses or
counter claims for recovery or possession, restricting the
maintenance or setting up of either. Upon amendment in
1~)-l/ this section was n1ade applicable also to the property
sold to the county prior to 1939 under the earlier law,
which was 80-10-66, R.S.U., 1933, and the restriction on
defenses "-as eliminated. As applied to the case at bar,
this means that there was no restriction as to the defense
after the effective date of the 1947 amendment C~Iay 13,
1947), if it be assumed that this is a suit involving recovery or possession of lands. Since the defense in this
action was interposed subsequent to 1fay 13, 1947, to\\-it: February 4, 1948, it is not ·barred. by 104-2-5.10.
If then this is a suit for recovery or possession, it could
be that the action is barred originally by 104-2-5, and now
by 104-2-5.10, but that the defense is not barred.
104-2-6 does not relate to recovery or possession of
real property but to actions "founded upon the title to
real property or to rents or profits out of the same.''
In analyzing these sta:tutes, we should not overlook
the intent of the legislature as indicated by 104-2-5 to
protect tax titles. The interest of the state is to apply
property taxes equally and compel all property to bear
its fair share of the load. If tax titles are made invulnerable they are made valuable and the county will be
better able to sell them for all of the delinquent taxes.
In 104-2-5 the bar of the statute is placed against

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

''actions brought for the recovery of real property. held
by another under tax deed.'' This is not ambiguous and
deals with possessory actions. 104-2-5.10 still deals with
possessory actions and would he inconsistent with the
other statute if it barred actions and counterclaims by
tax title holders. And the omission of the word "defenses'' is consistent with that. If the former owner is in
possession and continues in possession he 1nay defend
that possession and preserve the status quo even after
four years fron1 the auditor's deed has run; hut if such
forn1er mvner needs affirmative relief his clai1n ·will be
barred after four years.
But 104-2-6 does not deal with possession-it deals
with ''title to real property or to rents or profits out of
the same'' and the former owner is denied right of action
or defense because of his delay. The former owner may
be considered to have abandoned his claim and is not in
possession to give notice of claim, so the legislature's
intent to settle tax titles requires that the former owner
have no right to interfere with the title after four years.
This approach harmonizes the statutes and is backed
h~· reason. The former owner is compelled to take his
action within four years unless he is in possession, in
which case he can defend his possession but cannot expand it by action or counterclaim.
It is doubtful whether any other view could be upheld under the constitution. These statutes commence to
run from the auditor's deed to the county. At that time
there is no tax title holder and no cause of acdon. To
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permit the statute to start running at that time might
bar the remedy before the right of action has materialized fron1 a sale by the county to a prospective tax-payer.
This would tend to depreciate the values of tax titles, and
would be based upon a violation of constitutional principles in barring n remedy before the right has become actionable.
This principle was thus stated in Taylor v. Miles,
5 Kansas -198, 7 A1n. Rep. 558, at 566 :
··A statute of limitation can only be applied
where one person has received or suffered some
injury fr01n another person either in contract
or tort. It must operate to bar a oause of action,
for it semns absurd to say that a cause of action
can be barred if no cause of action has ever accrued.''
This court has recognized the principle by its holding
in State Tax Comrp.ission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177,
100 Pac. 2d 575, 131 ALR 816 that a cause of action accrues when it becomes remediable in 'the courts, with all
prerequisites cleared away. In that case this Court
quoted with approval the following statement from
Sweetser v. Fox, 43 Utah 40, 48-49, 134 P. 599, 602, 47
LRA (NS.) 145, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 620:
''It is a rule of universal application that a
cause or right of action arises the moment an
action may be maintained to enforce it and that
the statute of limitations is then set in motion.
The test, therefore, is, Can an action be main-
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tained upon the particular cause of action in
quef'tion ~ If it can, the statute begins to run.''
See also 34 Am. Jur. 47; 54 C.J.S. 204.
The Court should hold tha:t the counterclaim of the
tax title holders is not barred and that they should have
had judgment on the pleadings and on the evidence.
Point 4

It was not error to admit testimony that the deed from
Bowers Inve~stm,ent Company to V. Lynn Hansen was in
fact a mortgage transaction.

Appellant considers this matter under Point 3 of his
argun1ent. lie argues that there was no evidence that
he got nothing hy his deed from Hansen and also that the
evidence was not admissible because the issue was not
raised by the pleadings. The two positions are inconsistent.
\Vas the evidence admissible'
The evidence was of two kinds: that Hansen had no
title to convey because his was only a security interest
and that Hansen told Pender he owned nothing from
which it follows that Pender was not a bona fide purchaser for full value.
No contention is made that evidence of lack of good
faith or of notice of lack of title was improperly received. Appellant squarely objected, however, to introduction of evidence that Hansen's deed fr01n Bowers Investment Company was actually a mortgage (R. 125-126,
131.)
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The answr>r of defendants Bower~ alleges that appellants "haYe no right, title or interest in said real
property as deseribed in plaintiff's Third Amended
C01nplaint and that no other party has any right, title
or interest in and to said property." (R. 60) In effect
this is a denial of appellant's title and an assertion of
their own title. Appellant so characterizes it. (App.
Brief, 36.)
~-\._ppellant's Brief (pp. 36, 37) belabors a point about
pleading equitable title. There was no effort to show
equitable title in Bowers, but legal title, as claimed in
their answer. Proof that Hansen got equitable title
only defeated Bowers as well as appellant. (R. 172).
Appellant has no support for the view that the
e\idence was inadmissible for the purpose of defeating appellant. There was no request to limi't its effect
and it was already admissible under the general denial
to show no title in appellant.
''Para. 1998. Right To Show That Deed was
Intended as a l\fortgage Under Denial of Ownership. In actions in ejectment and suits to quiet
title or to foreclose a vendor's lien, a denial in
the answer of an allegation of ownership in the
complaint raises an issue upon which the defendant may show that a deed under which plaintiff claims title was given as security for a debt,
and was in tended as a mortgage.'' Bancroft,
Code Pleading, P. 3432.
General rules of pleading sustain the court in admitting this evidence.
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''As a rule, a general denial is a cornplete
defense unless inconsistent with the specific allegations of the answer. It puts in issue every
material allegation of the complaint, that is, every
material allegation constituting the cause of action. For example, it puts in issue allegations as
to nonpayment of the note sued on, ownership,
title, and value, as well as an allegation that defemlant claims some interest in the land described
in the complaint.'' Bancroft, Code Pleading, P.
612.

''Under a general denial evidence is admissible as to all1natters which go to prove that the
plaintiff ncYer had any cause of action, even
though such matters going to the original cause
be affirmative in their character. Under this rule
c•vidence of any fact is admissible which is inconsistent with and thus negatives the plaintiff's
cause of action." Bancroft, Code Pleading, P. 962.
That evidence showing an instrument in form a deed
was in fact a mortgage is admissible is hardly open to
question, so far as the parol evidence rule is concerned.
Brown v. Skeen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P. 2d 24, 32; Bybee v.
Stuart, ------, Utah ______ , 189 P. 2d, 118, 122.
Point 5
App·ellant had no tiile to the prop~rty and judgment
against him as to all parties was right.

Appellant does not argue this point in his Brief,
but is content to rely on a quit claim deed from V. Lynn
Hansen, who appeared to he owner of record. (Exhibit
A, pages 7 and 10).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
The Court found (R. 90) and the evidence established (R. 131, 1-U) that appellant's grantor had only
a mortgage interest in this proper'ty. Hansen could
ther·eby ronyey only that which he had, and since the
nwrtgage had been paid (R. 132) Hansen had nothing.
~eetion 78-1-12, U.C.A. 1943.
In Kix Y. Tooele County, 101 Utah 84, 118 P. 2d 376
at page 377 this Court said:
"Plaintiff's title is founded upon quit-claim
deeds. ~nell deeds do not imply the conveyance
of any particular interest in property. See Section 78-1-12, R.S.U. 1933, as compared with Section 78-1-11, R.S.U. 1933. Plaintiffs acquired only
the interest of their grantors, be that interest
what it may."
This is the rule stated in the annotations at 44
A . L.R. 1266, and 162 A.L.R. 556. See also l\fessenger v ..
Peter, 129 Mich. 93, 88 N. W. 209.
Appellant is not a purchaser in good faith and for
value and has no standing to claim that his interest is
superior to any other interest.
On the question of good faith and payment of value
hy appellant it is not directly material whether the conveyance from the Bowers Investment Company to Hansen (Exhibit 1) is a deed in legal effect or a mortgage.
If the deed conveyed fee title from Bowers Investment
Company to Hansen, the title apart from tax deeds is
in F. B. Bowers, for Hansen conveyed to F. B. Bowers
at a date prior to the deed to appellant (Exhibits 3 and
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;) ) . ]ijven though the deed to F. B. Bowers was not recorded it prevails over a deed to a purchaser who first
records but who does not purchase either in good faith
or for full value. If the conveyance from Bowers Investment Company to Hansen is found by this court to
be in fact a mortgage, 'then the title apart from tax
deeds is in the Bowers Investment Company. Evidence
is in the record (R. 132) that the obligation owing
Bowers Investment Company to Hansen, for which the
deed was security, was paid by the Bowers Investment
Company.
"The general rule is that payment of the
mortgage debt ipso facto et eo instanti extinguishes the mortgage." ( 36 Am. J ur. Sec. 406,
891, and cases cited.)

" * * * it is certain that the rnortgagee's interest, whatever name may be given it, is terminated by pa·yment of the debt secured * * •X< and no
conve:vance by the mortgagee is ncessary to perfect the mortgagor's estate." (36 Am. Jur., Sec.
413, 894 and cases cited.)
The question whether appellant may defeat this interest which is prior in time arises only if appellant is a
purchaser in good faith for full consideration.
Appellant purchased with notiee of ownership of
the property in someone other than his grantor. He
claims through Hansen who told him prior to completing the transaction that he (Hansen) did not own the
_property. The record on page 135 reads:
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· 'l \nut: You were asked to tell what you
said to ~l r. Pender.
"_.\: \Yell, in substance, I told him I didn't
own the property.''
~ince appellant was notified directly that his grantor
did not own the property which was to be conveyed,
appellant wns put on notice that some other person
owned the property. Appellant could not in good faith
expect to obtain rights grea:ter than his grantor had to
conYey, even over an unrecorded interest when knowledge
had been brought home to appellant that his grantor had
no interest. Appellant states (App. Brief 28) that there
is no evidence that Hansen advised appellant during
negotiations that the deed held by him was only a mortgage, and hence argues that appellant could not have
had notice. This is not controlling for it is not essential
to constitute lack of good faith that appellant receive a
full explanation of his grantor's lack of Htle.
A later purchaser who had information of a fact or
facts that would put a prudent man on inquiry, and
which would, if pursued, lead to actual knowledge of
the state of the title, is not a purchaser in good faith.
Possession of the land in one other than the grantor is
sufficient fact to put on inquiry. (Toland v. Corey, 6
Utah 392, 24 P. 190, aff'd 154 U. S. 499, 14 S. Ct. 1144.)
The san1e result should follow if the purported grantor
informs the later purchaser that he is not the owner.
It is not essential that appellant be informed by
Hansen of the exact state of the title.
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''To char-ge a .person with notice of an outstanding equitable interest it is not necessary that
he have notice of the identity of the holder thereof; it is sufficient if he has notice that the title
of the person from whom he buys is subject to the
outstanding interest." (55 Am. Jur., P. 1070.)
Since Hansen told appellant that he did not own the
property, appellant had notice that the title he purchased was subject to an outstanding interest.
Appellant lacked good faith for he deliberately ignored interest outs~tanding against the title of his grantor. (55 Am. Jur., See. 687, p. 1069).
"The (recording) statute \Vas not enacted to
protect one who:-·e ignorance of the title is deliberate and intentional, nor does a 1nere nominal -consideration satisfy the requirement that a valuable
consideration must be paid. Its purpose is to protect. the man who honestly believes he is acquiring
a good title, and who invests some substantial
sum in reliance on that belief." Wisconsin River
Land Co. v. Selover, 135 Wis. 594, 116 N. 265,
16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1073 (1908).
Substantially the same language is used in Beach v.
Faust, 2 Cal. 2d 290, 40 P. 2d 822 (1935).
Appellant cites authorities in his brief at pages 33
to 35 to establish good faith in appellant but ~the cases
are not analogous to the case at bar. The section quoted
from Thompson on Real Pr-operty. Vo. 8, Sec. 4506,
contains within itself the reason why appellant did not
purchase in good faHh.
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" * * * reasonable diligence * * * is held
satisfied by the examination of the public records
unl,ess h c has notice of d,efects not disclosed by
the records."
Respondents sub1nit that appellant had notice of defects
not disclosed by the records-that his grantor did not
haYe title - and therefore examination of records alone
was not reasonable diligence. Respondents also submit
that appellant was "wilfully blind'' (App. Brief 34)
to the defects in his grantor's title.
The annotation at 109 A.L.R. 746 et seq., cited by
appellants (Page 34) is not in point with the case at bar
for it is limited {o authorities dealing with notice to
defeat good faith from sources such as ''reputation in
the community", "common rumor", "hints", "general
reports", and "casual conversation by strangers". Appellant did not learn of defects in his grantor's title by
any of these sources. Appellant was told directly by his
grantor.
The case of Hall v. Livingston (App. Brief 35) is
n.ot in point for the purchaser was told "by a certain
person, prior to the purchase that such person understood'' the ,property was subject to a trust. The information did not come from an im1nediate source such as
grantor; the court held the inforn1ation to be only a
"common rumor". Respondents submit that the information obtained by a:ppellant was a direct statement of
defect in ,the title from appellant's grantor. The section
quoted by appellant at page 35 from Hall v. Livingston
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is incomplete and does not reveal the entire view of the
court. The court continues :
"It is not meant, by this (that notice m}lst
be more than would excite a cautious and wary
purchaser) that a purchaser can be affected only
hy some direct an,d positive statement from the
party interested; notice may be implied from cireums tances (if clear and unequivocal).''
It is the court's position, therefore, that if a purchaser
received a direct and positive statement, such would
be a fortiori lack of good faith.
The case of Raymond· v. Flavel is not in point because the court found no evidence showing that any defect ever existed.
Furthermore, appellant did not pay sufficient value
to Hansen to obtain the protection of the recording
statutes to defeat a prior unrecorded interest.
The record discloses the amount paid by appellant
to Hansen to be nominal. The record ( 143, 144) reads :

"Q.

A.

*

'' Q.

(of l\fr. Hansen): Is your recolleetion of-the
transaction that the amount was large considering the property or that it was a nominal consideration~
I would say that it was almost nil relative
to the value of the property.''
* * *
Do you reeall whether it was less than a
hundred dollars~
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A.

I mn sure it was, sir.

Q.

Do you recall whether it was less than fifty
dollars~

A.
~\nd

I an1 inclined to think it was."

on page 1:11 :

''Q.

~Ir. Pender, how much did you pay Mr. Han-

sen for that (the
..\.

deed)~

Twenty-five doilars."

This amount of consideration is not adequate to
enable appellant to be a bona fide purchaser for value.
'' * * * protection (as a bona fide purchaser)
has been denied where the amount paid was so
insignificant in comparison with the value of the
property as to be deemed unsubstantial * * * . ''
(55 Am. Jur., Sec. 737, P. 1103).

In the following cases the amount paid was so small~that
the court denied protection as a bona fide purchaser:
Wisconsin River Land Co. v. Selover, 135 Wis 594, 116
N.\V. 265, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1073 (1908), (paid $5, assessed for $150), (See annotation 16 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1073); Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 31 N.E. 944
(1892), (paid $10, worth $20,000); Bailey v. Colombe, 45
S. D. 443, 188 N.W. 203 (paid no more than $100, worth
$5,000); Dunn v. Barnun, 2 C.C.A. 265, 51 Fed. 355 (paid
$100, worth $30,000) ; Ochenknowship v. Dunaj, 244
N.Y.S. 267, aff'd 232 A. Div. 441, 251 N.Y.S. 589 (1930),
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(required consideration to be "valuable" in the sense
that a ''fair equivalent is given for the property granted''.) In the \Visconsin River Land Co. case, supra,
which is closely in point ·with the case at bar, the court
denied protection as a bona fide purchaser and stated:

* circumstances surrounding the purehase which conclusively show the wilful failure
on the part of the defendant to make inquiry when
inquiry was loudly suggested only reinforce the
conclusion that the defendant purchased for a
song only a mere possibility of title and that he
was fully aware of that faet. ''
''

,.,

o;(<

It must appear that a purchaser under a quit claim
deed is intending to purchase the land, and not merely
a chance of title. (l\fcDonalcl v. Belding, 1-15 U. S. 492,
36 L. Ed. 788, 12 S. Ct. 892; ~Toelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S.
21, 37 L. Ed. 350, 13 S. Ct. 426.)
Several courts have held that if a purchaser pay~
only a nominal consideration, such purchaser is by this
fact alone put on notice that the title of his vendor is
subject to unknown interests, and is therefore not an
innocent purchaser. (Wisconsin River Land Co. v. Selover, s1tpra; and Ten Eyck v. \Vitbeck, supra). While
appellant in the case at bar had actual notice of an outstanding interest, the nominal amount paid is an additional factor to negative good faith. The record reads
on page 15_2, aHer ~fr. Pender had testified that he paid
$2G for the property:
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"Q.

\Yhat would you say the present value of this
piece of property is, Mr. Pender¥

~-\.

In Ill)' estimation, property is worth just what
you can get it for.

Q.

\Yonldn 't the market on this property 1n
your opinion bring more than $5,0001

A.

I wouldn't know. * * *

Q.

\Yell, yon do know that property * * * south
on :J[ain Street * * * has considerable value
now, don't you?

A.

It has a certain value, reasonable value. I
·would say it at least had the assessed value ..

* * *"
Appellant (App. Brief, 29) argues that respondents
n1ay not assert that appellant has not paid valuable consideration because the amount respondents have paid for
the tax deed does not represent the full value of the
property: On the question of bona fides of appellant, it
is not material what amount respondents paid for the tax
title. The issue does not turn on who paid the most
consideration, but on priority of rights. The controlling
point is whether appellant is entitled to the protection
of the bona fide purchase doctrine to defeat a prior unrecorded interest. If appellant has not paid adequate
consideration, the unrecorded prior interest is not cut
off and the title is in F. B. Bowers or the Bowers Investment Company. And this will be decided without
reference to evidence of amount paid for the tax deeds.
Appellant apparently asserts the position that the
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consideration is not nominal because they will be forced
,to pay the tax .liens on the property before they can
get clear title. (App. Brief~ 29-30). Whether appellant
m~y now or in the future have to pay the tax liens or
any other expenses incident to ownership is not material
to the bona fides of appellant at the time he took a quit
claim deed of the property from Hansen for $25. For
appellant to avail himself of the bona fide purchase doctrine, he n1ust show that he paid sufficient value to Hansen, his grantor.
Even if the value of the property is reduced by 'the
amount of the tax liens which appellant asserts he
n1ust pay in order to quiet title, the rema"ining value of
the property is several thousand dollars. Then for this
interest, appellant paid $25. This is still nominal consideration.
Point 6
Refusal to p~ermit appellant to am,end his complaint in
the midst of tbre trial was not error.

This is argued by appellant as his Point 2. (App.
Brief, 23-24). He says this motion was made "at the
commencement of the trial of the case". Actually this
1notion was made in the middle of the trial. (R. 146).
Appellant's authorities indicate that permitting such
amendment would probably not have been an abuse of
discretion, and nothing more. Appellant made no offer
of proof, indicated nothing about the nature of his claim
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and has not shown any prejudice resulting from the
denial of the motion.
Appellant was not prejudiced by denial of his a·ttenlpt to plead laches since appellant failed to establish
his own title. Estoppel of respondents from claiming
title because of laches could not be asserted against respondents to prevent respondents from showing that
appellant had no title. Since the basis for the judgInent of no cause of action of appellant against respondents is appellant's lack of title, appellant could
not have used evidence of estoppel even though it were
pleaded.
Apart from prejudice, the proposed amendment was
untimely.
The amendment, if permitted, would have introduced a new issue requiring additional preparation and
evidence. It was not offered prior to the trial but later
in the proceedings-at 3 :32 P.M., of the day of trial (H.
146).
Point 7
Respondents' ·evidenc·e of title was sufficient to support judgm·ent quieting their title against appellant.

This is appellant's Point 4.
How the court rules on respondent's claim cannot
concern appellant if appellant has no ti>t.le.
In Campbell v. Union Savings and Investment Co.,
63 Utah 37 4, 226 P. 190, 193, the plain tiff alleged he was
the owner in fee simple and in possession of certain
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land and the defendant claimed through a mortgage.
The defendant's claim was judged invalid and judgment \vas given for plaintiff. The defendant appealed
and this Conrt affirmed, and stated:
'' Tnw it is that defendant now insists that
the plaintiff's proof of title is deficient. In view,
however, of defendant's answer and counterclaim,
that fact cannot affect her rights in the property.
Let it be remembered that the court's judgment
is expressly based upon the allegations of the
complaint, the averments of the answer, and
those in the reply. If, therefore, the defendant has
shown no right to or interest in the premises,
which it has not, how can it be heard to complain
that the court erred in adjudging plaintiff to be
the owner as against the defendant~ Certainly
plaintiff's title, however defective it may be, is
nevertheless ample to withstand ,the assaults of
the defendant so long as the defendant shows no
right, title or interest whatever in the property.''
In Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 609, 131 Pac. 37, at
page 58 the court implies that an appellant who has no
title cannot successfuJly dispute. a ruling permitting
plaintiff to show additional title:
"Appellant thus failed to prove title by adverse possession and, since he also failed to prove
any other title, the court was clearly justified in
finding against his claim of title .... If it were
conceded, therefore, that respondent had failed
to prove a good ~title, or that the court had erred,
as claimed by appellant, in permitting her to set
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up an additional title ... Yet it n1ust also be conceded that her title is ce~tainly good as against
appellant, since he established no valid claim or
title, either in law or equity, and for that reason
also any error the court may have committed in
the particular just stated could not have affected,
and did not affect any of his rights.''
'• Having failed to establish title in himself,
he cannot complain of insufficiency of the evidence upon which the court adjudged title to be
in the defendant.'' Hopkins v. Slusher, 266 Ky.
300, 98 S.W. 2d 932, 108 A.L.R. 662.
So long as the judgment against appellant Is affirmed the ruling on respondent's counterclaim and affirmative defense are comparatively unimportant. Respondents' quarrel then becomes one with Bowers and
Bowers Investment Company. Appellant carefully points
out that Bowers filed a disclaimer. (App. Brief, 2). This
was undoubtedly filed to avoid risk of costs under 10457-2, U.C.A. 1943. But appellant slyly agrues that this
disclaimer was an admission that Bowers had never had
a real claim and that he abandoned whatever claim he
had. (App. Brief, 33). This disclailner was never served
on respondents and counsel saw it for the first time af'ter
the appeal was perfected. Had this been served on respondents we would have moved to correct it to show
that Bowers had sold his interest to respondents for
many times what appellant paid Hansen for a quit claim
deed. Surely appellant knows that the suggestion at
page 33 of his Brief is both incorrect and improper.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
And furthermore, since appellant asserts title in himself
he cannot improve his position by virtue of the disclaimer
of BowPrs. Pacific Bond and l\fortgage Co. v. Beaver
County, 97 Utah 62, 89 Pac. 2d. 476 at 478.
\Yhat interest are respondents shown hy the record to have~
They have a deed from Salt Lake City which is not
a redemption or payment of special assess1nents but a
deed made following an offering and sale at public sale.
(R. 177, 178; Exhibit A, pages 11 and 13).
They haYP a prima facie title from certificate of
sale and auditor's deed for general taxes. (R. 178-180;
Exhibit A, pages 3, 5, 9). Appellant ~ays one of the
auditor's affidavits was missing from the 1928 assessment rolls. (App. Brief, 6). This is not in evidence.
(Sec. R. 117, 178-180).
The~· have paid taxes for 1946, 1947 and 1948. (R.
177).
They are in possession. (R. 91 Finding No. 10).
The regularit)· of the city's special assessment procedure was discussed (R. 118-119, 123-125, 180), but was
not inquired into as the Court and counsel believed a
remand and new trial would be necessar~· in any event
if appellant obtained a reversal. (R. 182-183).
The appellant having failed to show title, respondents can .prevail on the fact of possession found by the
court, and admitted by appellant's failure to deny the
allegations of paragraph 6 of the counterclaim. (R. 20,
54).
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The r tah statute 10-1-;)7 -1, U.C.A. 1943 has not been
construed on this particular question__Jthe sufficiency of
possession to quiet title. But courts in other jurisdictions
construing identical and similar stautes have held that
possesson is sufficient. In Crandall v. Goss, 1917, 30 Ida.
661, 167 Pac. 1025 at 1027, possession not sufficient to
give plaintiff adverse possessory title was held sufficient to support a judgment quieting title. The Idaho
statute construed was identical with the present Utah
10-l:-57 -1.
''this action may be n1aintained by res,pondent for possession of land in controversy and for
purpose of quieting his title thereto as against
appellant. ' '
To the same effect Is Child v. l\f organ, 51 1\iinn. 116,
52 N.\Y. 1127; and Knight v. Anderson, 38 Minn. 384,
37 N.W. 796 (possession of land sufficient to quiet title
even without proof by plaintiff of his interest in the
land).
In Bremer v. Bigelow, 8 Kan. 496, actual possession
was held to be sufficient to give occupant right to quiet
title against any person claiming an adverse interest.
The Kansas statute is practic3;lly the same as the present 104-57-1. 'To the same eff-ect are Wilson v. Glenn,
123 Kan. 16, 254 Pac. 694; Cramer v. l\IcCann, 83 Kan.
219, 112 Pac. 832; Giltenan v. Lemert, 13 Kan. 476;
Giles v. Ortman, 11 Kan. 59.
In Cramer v. -l\fcCann, supra, the court stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

"The appellants (defendants who had no
title) can only prevail upon their cross petition
upon the strength of their own title, and not upon
the weakness of their adversary's.
Never having acquired any title fo the real
estate themselves, they were not entitled to affirmative relief, and appellee (seeking to quiet
title) having been in peaceable possession of the
property under a claim of title when the action
was brought, the judgment, (quieting title in appellee) so far as any rights of appellants are concerned, is affirmed.''
See also annotation 46 L.R.A. N.S. 502 which collects authorities in accord. Cases cited to be contra
construe statutes 'lvhich differ materially from U.C.A.
104-57-1.
44 Am. Jur. states the rule: (at 37)
''Proof of the simple fact of possession of
property has been held as a general rule to entitle the possessor to maintain a suit to quiet
title against ... a claimant without title .... ''
(Cases cited).
51 C. J. states the rule: (at 172)
"But under many statutes providing for
actions for the determination of adverse claims,
it has been held that one in possession of, and
claiming title to, land may maintain the action
without further evidence of title.'' (Citing cases).
Utah authorities by dictum and implieation sustain
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the position that possession 1s sufficient interest to
quiet title. In Babrock v. Dangerfield, 1939, 98 Utah 10,
~)-1: P. 2d 863, the court held that prin1a facie title was
sufficient to enable a plaintiff to quiet title, even though
a plaintiff Inust succeed on the strength of his own title.
The court did not hold that prima facie title was the
only interest "'hich was sufficient to quiet title. The
rourt at 864 quoted language with approval from Redmond \~. :JicLean, 32 Cal. App. 729, 164 P. 15:
"At the trial plaintiff, in support of his
rlaim, testified that at the commencement of the
action he was, and for a long time prior thereto
had been, in possession of said lot.... This evidence, uncontradicted, was sufficient as a prima
facie showing to es'tablish plaintiff's right as
against defendant to a decree quieting his title
to the lot ~o described.''
A claim of possession was therefore ruled to be
sufficient.
In Mercur Coalition Min. Co. v. Cannon, 1947, -------Utah ________ , 184 P. 2d. 341 at 342, the court found that the
plaintiff did not have possession but by dictum indicated that possession would be sufficient:
"Appellant relies on the rule of law that
actual possession under a claim of ownership
makes out a prima facie case against a stranger
to the title, and unless controverted by one claiming an interest in the property is sufficient to
justify a decree quieting title jn the plaintiff. If
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the evidence was sufficient for the court to make
a finding thrut appellant was in actual possession
under a claim of ownership, then it would be
necessary for the defendant to establish an intf're~;t in himself."
Appellant argues that the title conveyed to respondents by Salt Lake City could not be valid because based
on an assessment prior to the sale for general taxes
(App. Brief, 39-40). Appellant cites Petterson v. Ogden
City, ........ Ftah ........ , 176 P. 2d. 599, and Western Beverage Co. v. Hansen, 98 Utah 332, 96 P. 2d. 1105, as so
holding.
Let it be assumed here that the tax title from the
county was invalid for failure of the auditor to include
no affidavit on the 1928 assessment rolls. This means
that no valid general tax assessment was made and
there is therefore nothing to interfere with the inquiry
of whether the city's title based upon special assessn1ents
was valid. The Western Beverage case holds simply that
a valid general tax lien takes precedence over an otherwise valid city tax lien. The Petterson case holds the
general tax deed in that case to be void and then considers the validity of the city's special assessment lien.
It is patent that if Ogden City followed assessment proced~ues correctly it would ultimately prevail in that controversy. That rule should be applied to this case, if
this question should he considered.
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SU~LMARY

AND CONCLUSION

.:\ppellant has not shown himself entitled to any relief in this Court from the judgm·ent of the trial court
that his quit claim deed was ineffectual to pass title,
both because the consideration paid was nominal and because appellant had notice that his grantor had no title.
This being true, appellant is in no position ·to question
this Court in affirming the judgment of the Distrct
Court.
Beyond this, respondents have shown that they were
in possession of the property and are therefore entitled
to the decree quieting their title against appellant, without consideration of whether the tax title or the deed
from Salt Lake City or the payment of taxes for three
years gave to respondents a sufficient title to support
a judgment quieting title. The Court should therefore
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
The first question raised chronologically was the motion for judgment on the pleadings, raising the special
statutes of limitations applicable to land where county
tax deeds have been given. Appellant's snit was brought
after the 4-year period had run and appellant did not
bring himself within Section 104-2-41, U.C.A., 1943,
because additional and necessary parties were added to
the first suit which was commenced within time. These
statutes protect the holder of the tax titles, and particularly where such holder is in possession, and the respon<lents should have prevailed on that motion and
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should prevail in this Court should it be considered. And
if the Court should conclude that appellant came within
the protection of 104-2-41, then he should be barred by
Section 104-29-2 because the first suit failed on its merits
and the bringing of the same suit a second time was
barred by this statute. The trial judge did not rule on
this question but indicated that if it became material his
ruling would be against the appellant.
This lea Yes undisposed of in the trial court the validity of the title respondents obtained from Salt Lake
City and the claim of Bowers Investment Company,
which could have been interpleaded on the court's own
motion. It appears unnecessary that either of these matters be inquired into and unnecessary that a new trial be
ordered for the purpos·e of examining into any further
matters.
The judgment of the District Court should be affinned and respondents should have their costs.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS AND BIRD
Attorneys for R. L. Bird and
Mae C. Bird, Defendants
and Respondents.
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